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Casey: Post Conviction Relief: Do It Once, Do It Right and Be Done with

Post Conviction Relief:
Do It Once, Do It Right and Be Done With It
INTRODUCTION

Many states, including Wyoming, enacted post conviction relief statutes during the 1960's in response to the broadening of federal habeas
corpus' and the resulting increase of federal habeas corpus petitions.2
Penitentiary inmates who demonstrate that their state or federal constitutional rights were violated during their conviction proceedings may pursue state post conviction relief.' State post conviction statutes allow
prisoners to challenge their sentencing or set aside a conviction. A
prisoner may invoke post conviction relief following his final appeal from
conviction or after the allotted appeal period has lapsed.5 State post conviction relief exists in conjunction with existing state and federal habeas
corpus procedures6 and
generally must be exhausted prior to filing a fed7
eral habeas request.
Although the Wyoming post conviction relief statute provides counsel for indigent petitioners, it is unclear when that appointment should
occur. In Alberts v. State,8 the Wyoming Supreme Court required appointment of counsel on initiationof a post conviction relief proceeding. 9 Apparently in response to Alberts, the 1988 Wyoming State Legislature
amended the post conviction statute to require review of the petition's
merits before counsel is appointed.' 0 The current Wyoming post conviction relief statute requires appointment of counsel only after the district
court determines that the post conviction petition meets statutory require1. The principal difference between habeas corpus and post conviction relief is where
the petition is filed. In habeas, the petition is filed in the court nearest the place of confinement; in post conviction, the petition is filed with the court of conviction. Raper, Post Conviction Remedies, 19 Wyo. L.J. 213, 214-15 (1965).
2. See R. POPPER, POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES IN A NUTSHELL § 5.1 (1978); UNIF. PosTCONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT, 11 U.L.A. 482 (1974).
3. WYo. STAT. § 7-14-101 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
4. Raper, supra note 1, at 217; but see Whitney v. State, 745 P.2d 902 (Wyo. 1987)
(sentencing cannot be reached under post conviction statutes).

5. D. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL AND STATE POSTCONVICTION
(2nd ed. 1987); POPPER, supra note 2, at § 1.1.

REMEDIES AND RELIEF § 1-5

6. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
AND CONCEPTS § 28.01 (1980). Habeas corpus is a challenge to the constitutionality of detention. POPPER, supra note 2, at § 7.1. Federal habeas corpus allows state prisoners access to

federal courts on assertion of a federal constitutional violation. WHITEBREAD, supra note
6, at § 28.01. State post conviction relief is permitted under Wyo. STAT. §§ 7-14-101 to -108
(1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988); habeas corpus is permitted under Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-27-100 to -134
(1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
7. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); see generally L. W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 52 (1981).
8. 745 P.2d 898 (Wyo. 1987).
9. In Alberts, the Wyoming Supreme Court construed Wyo. STAT. § 7-14-104 (1977,
Rev. 1987) as requiring appointment of counsel if the petitioner is determined to be a "needy
person." The Alberts court held that counsel was required at the initial stage of preparation
of the post conviction petition. Alberts, 745 P.2d at 901. See infra text accompanying notes
79-84. See also Long v. State, 745 P.2d 547 (Wyo. 1987).
10. 1988 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 46, § 1; WYo. STAT. § 7-14-104 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 19881.
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ments for content and merit and that the petitioner is without reasonable financial means to hire legal assistance."
A petitioner who wants counsel appointed must request it in his post
conviction petition.'" Under the current procedure, inmates often draft
post conviction petitions without assistance of counsel. This frequently
results in crudely drafted documents that are frivolous, fail to meet statutory requirements or neglect to address key legal issues.'" When the court
receives a petition for post conviction relief, its initial review is limited
to the face of the petition. The court has the difficult task of evaluating
the petition's merits before it can appoint counsel to investigate and clarify
the petitioner's allegations. The court can properly dismiss the petition
because it lacks merit or is facially inadequate.'" Thus, lack of counsel or
inadequate legal skills may prevent petitioners with legitimate constitutional claims from obtaining review due to a poorly drafted petition.'" In
addition, the Wyoming post conviction statute deems the first petition
res judicata, thereby preventing an inmate from filing a second petition
for relief.", The statute also limits appointment of counsel to first petitions. "
Although there is no federal"8 or state 19 constitutional right to
assistance of counsel to aid in preparing post conviction petitions, fundamental fairness requires "meaningful access" to the courts.2 0 The pertinent question is "How 'meaningful' is access when the petitioner is
unable to fathom the intricacies of legal argument and is without
assistance of counsel?"' 2 Access is not meaningful if the petitioner is unable to present his case due to illiteracy or ignorance of the law. Refusal
to provide counsel to draft the original post conviction petition undermines the premise of fairness in our judicial system and leads to a proliferation of inadequate petitions. The present practice of invoking res judicata
to bar subsequent petitions compounds this unfairness.
11. WYO. STAT. § 7-14-104 (1977 & Cum.Supp. 1988).
12. WYo. STAT. § 7-14-104 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988). The Wyoming Supreme Court
has interpreted the statute to mean that the court is not obligated to appoint counsel in
the absence of a request to do so. Bibbins v. State, 741 P.2d 115, 116-17 (Wyo. 1987); Fon-

dren v. State, 749 P.2d 767, 768 n.1 (Wyo. 1988).
13. YACKLE, supra note 7, at § 137.
14. Id at § 150; Wyo. STAT. § 7-14-103 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
15. YACKLE, supra note 7,at § 150.
16. Wvo. STAT. § 7-14-103 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
17. WYO.STAT. § 7-14-104(b)(iii) (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
18. In Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), petitioner claimed that his appointed
post conviction counsel failed to follow the procedures for withdrawal set out in Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The United States Supreme Court held that Anders did not
apply to collateral post conviction proceedings and the right to court appointed counsel did
not extend to discretionary appeals. See infra text accompanying notes 41-42. See also PopPER, supra note 2, at § 2.2.

19. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969) (federal and state courts are not obligated
to appoint counsel for prisoners seeking post conviction relief).
20. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611 (1974) (involving a defendant's appeal from the
denial of court appointed counsel for discretionary appeal).
21. See generally YACKLE, supra note 7, at § 137.
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This comment examines the Wyoming post conviction relief statutes
which address appointment of counsel and res judicata. It argues that
failure to appoint counsel at the beginning of the process, coupled with
application of res judicata to bar subsequent petitions, defeats the purpose of post conviction relief.
BACKGROUND

Federal
The United States Constitution does not create a right to appeal a
state criminal conviction. 22 Nor has the United States Supreme Court
required states to provide post conviction remedies for asserted constitutional violations.2 3 Despite the lack of mandatory appeal, most states grant
2
at least one appeal 4 and some sort of post conviction review. Consistent with the absence of a federal constitutional requirement for state post
conviction relief,26 no federal constitutional right to appointed counsel for
post conviction relief exists." However, once a state establishes a right
28
to appeal, indigents are entitled to counsel for that appeal. Even when
appeal is discretionary, the United States Supreme Court has stated that
an appeal must be meaningful" and that under some30circumstances, a
meaningful appeal requires the assistance of counsel.
The Supreme Court almost required state post conviction review in
Young v. Ragan.3 There the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's denial of a petitioner's claim that his sentencing violated the fourteenth amendment due process clause. On review, the United States
Supreme Court recognized that federal habeas corpus requires exhaustion of all state remedies but that many states do not provide post conviction procedures. 2 The Court held that states must provide prisoners
with a "clearly defined method" to raise claims of denied federal rights."
However, the Court did not define the "clearly defined method."
Ross, 417 U.S. at 611; see also WILKES, supra note 5, at § 9-1.
Finley, 481 U.S. at 555; Avery, 393 U.S. at 488.
Ross, 417 U.S. at 611-12.
Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1276 (Wyo. 1988) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting); see
also POPPER, supra note 2, at § 5.1.
26. Methods of post conviction review are generally lumped into one of three categories:
habeas corpus, coram nobis and those that fit neither category and are treated separately.
WILKES, supra note 5, at § 1.5; YACKLE, supra note 7, at § 1. Coram nobis challenges a judgment because of an error in fact. POPPER, supra note 2, at § 6.1.
27. The United States Supreme Court recently affirmed this rule in Finley, 481 U.S.
551, holding that the fourteenth amendment does not require appointment of counsel for
indigents in state post conviction proceedings. See generally WILKES, supra note 5, at § 4-23.
28. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigents convicted of thirteen felonies
were denied court appointed counsel for their only nondiscretionary appeal); see also Ross,
417 U.S. 600.
29. Ross, 417 U.S. at 612.
30. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S 778, 790-91 (1973) (suggesting that such circumstances
may include the nature of the proceeding, the complexity of the facts and circumstances
and the petitioner's ability to speak for himself).
31. 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
32. Id. at 238-39.
33. Id
22.
23.
24.
25.
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Sixteen years later in Case v. Nebraska,3 , the Court granted certiorari
to decide if the fourteenth amendment required states to provide post conviction remedies, but then did not reach the merits of the case. In Case,
the petitioner alleged an unconstitutional denial of counsel in state district court. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal because Nebraska law did not provide for post conviction review.
Three days prior to oral argument before the United States Supreme
Court, the Nebraska Legislature adopted a post conviction remedy. Consequently, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings under the
new statute. Justice Clark's concurrence did, however, suggest that
absence of a post conviction remedy may deny due process under the fourteenth amendment.3 1 In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan noted
that while the states have the primary responsibility for administering
their criminal laws, the fourteenth amendment and supremacy clause of
the United States Constitution require fair and just procedures.36
Although it concerned discretionary appeal rather than post conviction relief, the Court's ruling in Ross v. Moffit 11 set the stage for appointment of counsel under the fourteenth amendment. In Ross, the North
Carolina Supreme Court declined to appoint counsel to represent an indigent on his discretionary appeal. The United States District Court denied
a habeas corpus petition3 8 but the Court of Appeals reversed. 9 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court noted that counsel must be
provided for the indigent on the first appeal of right but reversed, holding that the fourteenth amendment due process clause did not require
counsel to be provided for a discretionary appeal. The key to the decision
was that meaningful access to the courts existed and refusal to appoint
counsel for discretionary appeal did not preclude meaningful access. The
Court stated "[ujnfairness results only if the indigent are singled out by
meaningful access to the appellate system because
the State and denied
0
of their poverty."4
The Court recently reiterated this position in Pennsylvania v. Finley."
There, the petitioner's appointed counsel reviewed the record and, finding no meritorious issues, requested the trial court's permission to withdraw. The court agreed with counsel and dismissed the appeal. On appeal,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that counsel's conduct violated the petitioner's constitutional rights. On certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the right to appointed counsel2
extends only to the first appeal of right and not to discretionary appeals.
34. 381 U.S. 336 (1965).
35. "Believing that the practical answer to the [constitutional] problem is the enactment by the several States of postconviction remedy statutes I applaud the action of
Nebraska." Id at 339-40 (Clark, J., concurring).
36. Id at 344 (Brennan, J., concurring).
37. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
38. Moffitt v. Blackledge, 341 F. Supp. 853 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
39. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973).
40. Ross, 417 U.S. at 612 (emphasis added).
41. 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
42. Id at 555.
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During the 1960's, the United States Supreme Court broadened the
availability of federal post conviction remedies for state convictions in
a series of cases known as the "post conviction trilogy."" The "post conviction trilogy" established guidelines for federal post conviction review
for prisoners in state or federal court. In Fay v. Noia,44 a petitioner imprisoned on a coerced confession was denied post conviction relief. The confession issue was heard and rejected at trial. The petitioner allowed the
appeal period to lapse before applying for habeas corpus. On certiorari,
the United States Supreme Court held that a prisoner's procedural default
in state court did not bar a habeas petition in federal court absent a deliberate bypass of the state remedies.45
In Townsend v. Sai," a petitioner confessed while under the influence
of police-administered truth serum. Following conviction, he claimed the
confession was illegal. After exhausting state remedies, he petitioned the
federal district court for habeas corpus. The district court refused to allow
the petitioner to call witnesses and, satisfied that the confession was voluntary, dismissed the petition. 7 The United States Supreme Court reversed
the lower court, holding that an evidentiary hearing was required for certain types of factual disputes and established
criteria for such relitiga48
tion in federal habeas corpus claims.

In Sanders v. United States," the petitioner's successive federal
habeas petitions were denied. On certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court considered the significance of prior proceedings on subsequent
habeas motions and remanded for a hearing on the second petition. The
Court discussed the application of res judicata and set guidelines for evaluating successive habeas petitions." The guidelines set by the Court provide that denial of a prior habeas application is given controlling weight
only if: 1) the same ground present in the later application was determined
adversely to the applicant on the prior application, 2) the prior determination was on the merits, and 3) the ends of justice
would not be served
5
by reaching the merits of the later application. '
43. Noia, 372 U.S. 391; Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Sanders v. United States,
373 U.S. 1 (1963); see also Wilkes, A New Role for an Ancient Writ: PostconvictionHabeas
Corpus Relief in Georgia (PartII), 9 Ga. L. Rev. 13, 32-35 (1974).
44. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
45. Id. at 438.
46. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
47. United States v. Sain, 265 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1958).
48. The United States Supreme Court's criteria are: 1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing, either at trial or in a collateral proceeding; 2)
the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; 3) the fact
finding procedure used by the state court did not afford a full and fair hearing, 4) there is
a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; 5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state court hearing; or 6) the applicant was not afforded a full and
fair fact hearing at the trial level. If any of these situations exist, an evidentiary hearing
is required. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312-18.
49. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
50. Id at 15-17.
51. Id.
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The combined effect of Noia, Townsend and Sanderswas a significant

expansion of the availability of federal habeas corpus. 2 For example, in
1960, 2,177 post conviction petitions were filed in federal district courts
by state and federal prisoners. By 1975, the number ballooned to 19,307,
a 786.9% increase. 3 The majority of these petitions were from state, not
federal, prisoners. 4 Largely as a result of this increase in federal post conviction petitions and a desire to retain state control over state prisoners,
states began to adopt state post conviction remedies. 5 By 1987, fortynine states had adopted modern post conviction remedies, 6 many
of which
57
are based on the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.
Uniform Post-ConvictionProcedure Act

In 1966, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the American Bar Association attempted to provide a solution
to the rising conflict between federal and state courts by updating the
1955 Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.5 8 The Act was intended to
establish a post conviction procedure meeting uniform standards of justice.

A major goal was to reduce the number of federal habeas corpus actions
and the resulting expense of unlimited post conviction relief applications.5 9
Recognizing the importance of assistance of counsel, the Act provides for
appointing counsel to indigents, stating:
(a) If an applicant requests appointment of counsel and the court
is satisfied that the applicantis unable to obtain adequate representation, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the appli-

cant. (Emphasis added.)',
This language mandates appointing counsel on a showing of the petitioner's indigence. Appointment is unrelated to the merits of the case.
The Act does not specifically address when counsel should be
appointed, but suggests that indigence is the sole prerequisite. The comments also imply that appointment should occur early in the process. The
comments' authors anticipated that legal counsel would review each peti61
tion to determine if it is proper and, if not, draft the necessary allegations.
The comments also suggest that case-by-case appointment of counsel is
inefficient; the preferred method is to provide counsel within the custodial
institution on a regular basis. 2
52. See YACKLE, supra note 7, at § 20.
53. POPPER, supra note 2, at § 1.3.
54. Id Of 19,307 petitions, 14,260 were from state prisoners and 5,047 were from federal prisoners.
55. YACKLE, supra note 7,at § 1. Fourteen states have authorized post conviction remedies by judicial order, thirty-six by statute. D. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL AND STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF § 9-2 (2nd ed. 1988 Supp.).
56. Michigan, the exception, limits post conviction relief to habeas corpus actions for
"old-fashioned jurisdictional errors." WILKES, supra note 5, at § 9-2.
57. UNIF. POsT-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT § 5, 11 U.L.A. 480-81 (1974).
58. Id
59. Id at 480 (Commissioners' Prefatory Note).
60. Id at 235 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
61. Id at 236.
62. Id (comment).
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Wyoming Generally
In 1961, Wyoming enacted one of the first post conviction statutes
in the nation.' 3 The Wyoming statute was modeled after the Illinois Post
64
Conviction Act rather than the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.
The Wyoming Act's stated purpose was to "provide a remedy for persons convicted and imprisoned in the penitentiary, who assert that rights
guaranteed to them by the Constitution of the United States or the State
of Wyoming, or both, have been denied or violated in the proceedings in
which they were convicted. "" One of the statute's principal goals was to
provide a state remedy to minimize trying state criminal issues in federal
courts., If no errors were present, the post conviction appeal record would
provide an adequate6 7basis for the federal court to affirm the state's post
conviction decision.
Appointment of Counsel
The 1961 Post Conviction Act stated that the court "shall appoint
counsel if [it] is satisfied that the petitioner has no means to procure coun69
sel .... " 6 The Act did not mention when counsel should be appointed.
In 1987, the Wyoming legislature amended the Act to require the court,
on request of a petitioner, to appoint the public defender to represent a
petitioner who the court determined was a "needy person."7 0 A "needy
person" was "unable to provide for the full payment of an attorney and
all other necessary expenses of representation. '71 The "needy person"
requirement was also subject to the proviso that the district court determine that the request for relief was a proceeding that a "reasonable per72
son with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense."
Again, no mention was made of when counsel should be appointed.
In Long v. State,"7 the trial court denied the defendant's petition for
post conviction relief without appointing counsel. The petitioner questioned whether failure to appoint an attorney for post conviction petition
63. 1961 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 63, § 4; Wyo. STAT. §§ 7-14-101 to -108 (1977 & Cum.
Supp. 1988). By 1965, only thirteen states had adopted a modem post conviction remedy:
Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon and Wyoming. WILKES, supra note 5, at § 3-5.
64. Sanchez v. State, 755 P.2d 245, 247 (Wyo. 1988). Illinois was the first state to enact
a new statutory post conviction remedy. WILKES, supra note 5, at § 3.5.
65. 1961 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 63.
66. State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, Teton Co., 696 P.2d 54, 59 (Wyo. 1985;
Raper, supra note 1, at 219 (essentially, Wyoming wanted one last chance to correct its errors
before relinquishing control to the federal courts).
67. Hopkinson, 696 P.2d at 59; Raper, supra note 1, at 215.
68. 1961 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 63, § 4.
69. Revisions in 1977 renumbered the provision for appointment of counsel but left
it substantively unchanged. Cutbirth, 751 P.2d at 1276 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting); WYo. STAT.
§ 7-14-104 (1977).
70. The Public Defender Act, 1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 176, §§ 1 to 3 (codified at Wyo.
STAT. § 7-6-101 to -114 (1977, Rev. 1987)), became effective on May 22, 1987 and did not
affect post conviction petitions filed prior to that date. Long, 745 P.2d at 550-51.
71. Wvo. STAT. § 7-6-102(a)(iv) (1977, Rev. 1987).
72. WYo. STAT. § 7-6-104(c)(iii) (1977, Rev. 1987).
73. 745 P.2d 547 (Wyo. 1988).
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was a denial of due process. The Wyoming Supreme Court reached its conclusion through statutory construction and did not address the due
process question. The court reversed the trial court, holding that the petitioner was a "needy person" under the post conviction statute and was
entitled to appointed counsel on petition for post conviction relief.7 4 After
determining that counsel was required, the court criticized the legislature's
attempt to clarify the procedure for appointing counsel by replacing the
statutory right to counsel with a court-assessed "reasonable person with
adequate means" test. It noted that the statute gives the trial court discretion in appointing counsel and that the standard is entirely subjective.
Justice Urbigkit stated "[t]his court is persuaded that the legislature
should settle for the test of indigence and permit counsel to pursue all
potential avenues of relief for a convicted indigent.'"
In his dissent, Chief Justice Brown argued that the convicted should
not be able to assert "any frivolous circumstance and automatically trigger the appointment of an attorney."76 Brown contended that the legislature never intended this result and that the public defender's staff would
need to be enlarged to accommodate the increased workload.
Justice Cardine also dissented, stating that an appellant is entititled
to an attorney for post conviction only if he is indigent and a reasonable
person would use his own money to pursue relief." Cardine did not consider the standard for appointment of counsel to be subjective and would
have the trial court review the facts and circumstances of each case prior
to appointing counsel."
In Alberts v. State,"7 a petitioner appealed the denial of his request
for appointed counsel to pursue his post conviction request. Granting the
petitioner's request for counsel, the Wyoming Supreme Court interpreted
the post conviction statute to require appointment of counsel upon initiation of post conviction proceedings if the petitioner has no means of
procuring counsel. The court also held that the representation of counsel
must include preparation of the post conviction petition.80 The court concluded that appointing counsel at the beginning of a post conviction appeal
would assure a complete and competently prepared petition."' As aptly
stated by Justice Macy:
74. The court found that the record was inadequate to support the trial court's denial
of counsel and remanded. Id at 549. At the time of Long's petition, the pertinent statute
required appointment of counsel if the court was satisfied that the petitioner had no means
to procure counsel. WYo. STAT. § 7-14-104 (1977). Subsequent legislation altered the wording to include a requirement that the court must determine that the proceeding was one that
a reasonable person with adequate means would bring at his own expense. Wyo. STAT. §
7-6-104(c)(iii) (1977, Rev. 1987).
75. Long, 745 P.2d at 552.
76. Id at 553 (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
77. Id at 555 (Cardine, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 555-56 (Cardine, J., dissenting).
79. 745 P.2d 898 (Wyo. 1987).
80. Id at 901.
81. Id
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To require someone unlearned in the law to file a post-conviction
relief petition asserting substantial denial of constitutional rights
would, in most cases, be an exercise in futility. Representation by
counsel also becomes essential when considering that failure to
raise any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights in an
original
post-conviction proceeding constitutes a waiver of such
82
claim.
Under Alberts, the petitioner must only meet the financial need test to
be assigned counsel.
In his dissent, Justice Cardine stated that no mandatory duty exists
to appoint counsel for post conviction claims.8 3 He reaffirmed his dissent
in Long asserting that the two statutes, read together, require the trial
court to appoint counsel to represent a "needy" person only if a reasonable person with adequate means would pursue the claim at his own
expense.84 Thus, Cardine asserts that appointment of post conviction counsel is not mandatory and application of a reasonable person test by the
trial court affords adequate protection for indigent petitioners.
The Wyoming Supreme Court and Wyoming legislature differ as to
when counsel should be appointed. Just five months after Alberts, the
Wyoming legislature changed the rules in a seemingly conscious effort
to avoid the result in Alberts.15 The newly amended statute imposes
preliminary hurdles that each petitioner must overcome before the district court appoints counsel.86 Prior to appointing counsel, the court must
evaluate the petition. It must determine that the petition is a first petition that is neither frivolous nor barred by statute and that raises issues
requiring the assistance of counsel.87 The court cannot consider the financial condition of the petitioner until this test is met 8 Then, if the court
determines the petitioner is without "any reasonable financial means" to
hire his own attorney, it may appoint an attorney.8 9
82. Id
83. Id at 902 (Cardine, J., dissenting).
84. Id
85. Alberts was decided November 18, 1987. The amendment was adopted March 11,
1988 and became effective on June 9, 1988. 1988 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 46 § 3.
86. 1988 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 46 § 1; Wyo. STAT. § 7-14-104 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
87. The pertinent part of the 1988 post conviction relief statute reads:
(a) If requested in the petition, the court may appoint [an attorney] to represent
a petitioner who is determined by the court to be without any reasonable financial means to hire his own attorney.
(bi Before appointing the public defender or a private attorney to represent
a petitioner, the court shall determine that the petition:
(i) Is not frivolous;
(ii) Is a first petition under W.S. 7-14-101(b);
(iii) Is not barred under W.S. 7-14-103; and
(iv) Raises issues which cannot reasonably be presented by the petitioner
without the assistance of an attorney.
Wvo. STAT. § 7-14-104 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
88. WYo. STAT. § 7-14-104(b) (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
89. WYo. STAT. § 7-14-104(a) (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
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Res Judicata
Since their origin in 1961, the Wyoming post conviction statutes have
included a waiver provision for any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or amended post conviction petition. 0 The waiver provision was unchanged by the 1977"' and 1988
amendments 91and remains intact today. The Wyoming Supreme Court
has often urged that principles of res judicata are applicable, stating, "[it
is... universally recognized that post-conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal and the petition will not lie where the matters alleged
as error could or should have been raised in an appeal or in some other
alternative manner."93 Essentially, any claim that could have or should
have been brought in the original petition is barred by res judicata 4
The Wyoming Supreme Court refused a petitioner's third post conviction request in Reynoldson v. State.'5 Expressing its concern about
repeated relitigation of the same issues, the court reflected, "a comprehensive and adequate consideration and a finite disposition in one postconviction-relief proceeding is both indicated and mandated in the proper
administration of the justice delivery system." 9 Similarly, in Bibbins v.
State, 7 the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected a second post conviction
petition stating "the post-conviction relief statutes do not contemplate
successive petitions for post-conviction relief." 98
In Cutbirth v. State,99 a defendant asserted ineffective assistance of
counsel in his post conviction claim. The court concluded that ineffective
assistance of counsel can be raised in a post conviction petition but that
the defendant must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his counsel's
omissions.'00 The court stated that unless the defendant demonstrates
"good cause" for his failure to raise the issues on appeal and actual
prejudice arising from the failure, he is foreclosed from raising the claim
on post conviction.' 0 ' The court based its use of res judicata on principles
02
of finality and judicial economy and noted that it follows the federal rule.
90. WYO. STAT. § 7-14-103(a)(ii) (1977 &Cum. Supp. 1988); WYo. STAT. § 7-14-103 (1977,
Rev. 1987); 1961 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 63, § 3.
91. 1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157, § 3; Wyo. STAT. § 7-14-103 (1977, Rev. 1987).
92. 1988 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 46, § 1 (codified at Wyo. STAT. § 7-14-103 (1977 & Cum.
Supp. 1988)).
93. Munoz v. Maschner, 590 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Wyo. 1979).
94. WYo. STAT. § 7-14-103(a)(ii)-(iii) (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988). Issues that have been
litigated and decided are res judicata through issue preclusion. See YACRLE, supra note 7,
at § 27. Under claim preclusion, the petitioner's rights are merged with the first judgment
and later action on that same claim is barred even though those same claims were not raised.
icd.

95. 737 P.2d 1331 (Wyo. 1987).
96. Id at 1335.
97. 741 P.2d. 115 JWyo. 1987).
98. Id at 116.
99. 751 P.2d 1257 (Wyo. 1988).
100. The court noted that failure to raise a claim does not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel. Id at 1263.
101. Id at 1261-62.
102. Id at 1262.
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Other Jurisdictions
Time of Appointment
The Illinois post conviction statute,"'3 the model for the Wyoming statute, provides for assistance of a lawyer for the original post conviction
petition.'0 4 Appointment of counsel is mandatory if the post conviction
relief petition is not summarily dismissed as frivolous and the defendant
is indigent.' Failure to appoint counsel under these circumstances is specifically condemned as reversible error. 1 The stated purpose of the Illinois
statute is to provide assistance of counsel in drafting a "legally sufficient
petition." 17
Alaska's rules of criminal procedure require that counsel be appointed
to represent an indigent on his first post conviction application.' 0 The
applicable rule states that if the post conviction petitioner is indigent and
issues raised in his petition cannot be summarily dismissed, counsel shall
be appointed.'0 9 The Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted the statute
to require appointment of counsel "at the time the initial application is
filed." 0 The court reasoned that the post conviction petition must contain
genuine issues and that in order for the petition to meet this standard,
it is essential that the petitioner be represented by competent counsel."'
Colorado, like Alaska, extends the right to appointed counsel to post
conviction proceedings and provides counsel "at every stage of the
proceeding.""12 The Colorado statute requires the public defender to be
appointed "both before and after conviction" for each indigent defendant
who requests appointed counsel."3 In People v. Hubbard,"' the Colorado
Supreme Court considered the necessity of counsel in a post conviction
appeal. It concluded that assistance of counsel was essential in post conviction reviews unless the asserted claim is "wholly unfounded."' 5 The
court reasoned that, as a practical matter, a defendant unassisted by counsel would be unable to prepare an adequate petition complying with state
16
law.
103. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1 (Smith-Hurd 1973 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
104. Wilson v. State, 39 II. 2d 275, 235 N.E.2d 561, 562 (1968).
105. People v. Collins, 161 Ill.
App. 3d 285, 514 N.E.2d 499, 501-02 (1987). The statute
states: "[u]pon the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a post-conviction proceeding, if the
trial court determines that the petitioner is indigent, it... shall appoint counsel on appeal,
...without cost to the petitioner." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l10A,para. 651(c) (Smith-Hurd 1985).
106. Collins, 514 N.E.2d at 502.
107. People v. Polansky, 39 111.2d 84, 233 N.E.2d 374, 376 (1968).
108. Hertz v. State, 755 P.2d 406,408 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). Former ALASKA R. CRIM.
PRO. 35(c) was repealed and replaced by ALASKA R. CRIM. PRO. 35.1 effective Aug. 1, 1987.
109. "[ajpplicant is indigent... [w]here the court determines that the application shall
not be summarily disposed of on the pleadings... counsel shall be appointed to assist indigent applicants." ALASKA R. CRiM. PRO. 35.1(e) (1988 Supp.).
110. Donnelly v. State, 516 P.2d 396, 399 (Alaska 1973).
111. Id
112. People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo.245, 519 P.2d 945,948 (1974); People v. Naranjo, 738
P.2d 407, 409 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
113. Naranjo, 738 P.2d at 409; COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-1-103 (1986).
114. 184 Colo. 243, 519 P.2d 945 (1974).
115. 519 P.2d at 948.
116. Id
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The Oregon Post-Conviction Hearing Act " 7 requires appointment of
counsel to indigents without considering the merits or frivolity of the petition.118 Established to "eliminate the confusion"" 9 surrounding post conviction remedies, the statute requires appointing counsel before disposing
of any petition.2 0
Res Judicata
Like Wyoming, the Illinois statute waives any issues not raised in the
original or amended petition even if the subsequent petitions are on new
grounds.' The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that the post conviction act is not intended to provide repeated reviews of issues already
decided and limits post conviction appeals to one per petitioner.2"
However, the Illinois court refuses to apply res judicata where counsel
was not appointed for the first petition.2 Likewise, Alaska limits post
conviction petitions to one,"' but provides for mandatory appointment
2
of counsel to assure that the single opportunity is meaningful.1 1
Colorado also restricts post conviction appeals to one, reasoning that
if petitioners are provided post conviction counsel at all stages, the need
for additional proceedings is reduced. 126 If a petitioner is not provided with
counsel in his first post conviction petition, he is not necessarily precluded
from bringing a second petition on other grounds and has a statutory right
to counsel for his second motion.2 7 Similarly, the Oregon statute employs

117. OR. REV. STAT. § 138.510 to 138.680 (1983 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
118. (2) . .. If the circuit court is satisfied that petitioner isunable to pay such
expenses or to employ suitable counsel, it shall order that petitioner proceed
as an indigent person....
(3) In order to proceed as an indigent person, the circuit court shall appoint
suitable counsel to represent petitioner.
OR. REV. STAT. § 138.590 (2)-(3) (1983 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
119. Page v.Cupp, 78 Or. App. 520, 717 P.2d 1183, 1184 (1986).
120. Rodacker v. State, 79 Or. App. 31, 717 P.2d 659, 661 (1986).
121. "Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original
or an amended petition is waived." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-3 (Smith-Hurd 1973
& Cum. Supp. 1988).
App. 3d 929, 305 N.E.2d 423, 426 (1973).
122. McClain v. People, 15 Ill.
123. Polansky, 233 N.E.2d at 376.
124. Hampton v. Huston, 653 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982((citing ALASKA
R. CRIM. PRO. 35(j)). The current rule, 35.1(h) reads:
(h) Waiver of or Failure to Assert Claims. All grounds for relief available
to an applicant under this rule must be raised in his original, supplemental
or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted
in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken
to secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the
court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended
application.
Added by Supreme Court Order 822 effective August 1, 1987.

125.

ALASKA

R.

CRIM. PRO.

35.1.

126. Hubbar4 519 P.2d. at 948-49.
127. Naranjo, 738 P.2d at 409.
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res judicata to limit post conviction relief petitions to one; however, the
statute
includes an exception if the petitioner was not represented by coun28
sel.1
ANALYSIS

The Wyoming Supreme Court has interpreted the availability of post
conviction relief narrowly, concluding that:
[p]ost-conviction relief is available only in certain instances where
the error is of constitutional magnitude and the petition alleges
denial of defendant's constitutional rights .... Post-conviction
relief may be grantedonly in extraordinarycircumstances which
strongly suggest a miscarriageof justice and may not be entertained as a substitute for raising appealable issues. (emphasis
added).1 9
"Constitutional rights" are limited to determination of whether the defendant was denied right to counsel, to have witnesses, and to prepare and
present his defense.1 3 0 Post conviction relief is not a substitute for appellate review of a conviction, nor is it treated as an appeal.'' Further, only
one post conviction proceeding is permitted.' 2 In sum, post conviction
relief procedures are very limited in scope; they are not a panacea for conviction providing a sure route to freedom.
Notwithstanding the rarity of successful post conviction petitions,'
the Wyoming Supreme Court has stressed the importance of the opportunity for relief. In 1979, the court stated that post conviction relief is
intended to grant relief when a sentence has been imposed without benefit
of a fair trial. 3 4 The Wyoming Court later stated, "[w]e will afford appellant the opportunity to meaningfully pursue the courses available under
Wyoming jurisprudence, and we will give it our best attention
even though
''
appellant may be mistaken about his right to relief. 13
128. OR. REV. STAT. § 138.550 (1983).
129. Hoggatt v. State, 606 P.2d 718, 722 (Wyo. 1980).
130. Johnson, 592 P.2d at 287. The Wyoming Court's scope of post conviction review
appears to be narrower than federal habeas review, raising questions outside the scope of
this comment. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (federal habeas corpus does
not extend to fourth amendment claims where there was an opportunity for a full and fair
hearing); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)(there is no jurisdictional bar to review
based on a claim of double jeopardy); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)(United States
Supreme Court reviews sentencing under the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment); contra Whitney, 745 P.2d at 904 (sentencing cannot be reviewed
under post conviction statute); cf Cutbirth, 751 P.2d at 1261-62 (the scope of state post conviction relief should be limited to the scope of federal habeas).
131. Pote v. State, 733 P.2d 1018 (Wyo. 1987).
132. WYo. STAT. § 7-14-103(a)(ii} (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988); Bibbins, 741 P.2d at 116.
133. In Wyoming's 26-1/2 year history of post conviction remedies the court has heard
15 appeals, see Sanchez v. State, 755 P.2d 245, 248 (Wyo. 1988)(Urbigkit, J., dissenting),
but only one prisoner has been successful in overturning his sentence. See Cutbirth, 751 P.2d
at 1297 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
134. Johnson, 592 P.2d at 286.
135. Hopkinson, 696 P.2d at 60.
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Time of Appointment
The purpose of post conviction relief is to enable the unlawfully imprisoned to obtain review of their conviction or sentencing with the possibility of a new trial when justice requires."' The United States Supreme
Court has stated that post conviction proceedings must be more than a
formality." 7 Further, state procedures cannot create a meaningful appeal
process for petitioners with economic means while relegating an indigent
petitioner's appeal to a "meaningless ritual.' ' 3 The states must assure
the indigent "an adequate opportunity to present [his] claims fairly."'' 9
A legal background or training obviously provides an advantage
within the legal system. 4 0 A petitioner should not be penalized for his inability to recognize his position, to adequately formulate an argument or
articulate facts which show a constitutional violation. Appointed counsel is necessary for an indigent petitioner to have an adequate opportunity to present his case. Counsel is of no use unless appointed at the
beginning of the initial post conviction process. In addition, where res
judicata is applied, as in Wyoming, counsel must be appointed for the first
petition because subsequent petitions are barred by statute.
The United States Supreme Court's statements regarding the necessity of counsel, whether made in a post conviction setting or not, support
this view. The Court concedes that the unskilled or uneducated may be
unable to adequately present their case"' and that even the educated layman needs the "guiding hand of counsel" to cope with the intricacies of
the law.142 The Court has also acknowledged that the average defendant
does not have the legal skills necessary to protect himself in a criminal
court. 43 Appointed counsel is necessary when required by fundamental
fairness or when the petitioner lacks the skills to protect his guaranteed
rights.'" The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the right
to be heard would be "of little avail" if it did not include the right to be
represented by counsel.' 4' In addition, fundamental fairness requires
"meaningful access" to the courts.'46 Thus, the United States Supreme
Court has clearly stated that counsel is often essential to a fair proceeding and that indigency should not preclude such an opportunity."7
136. Avery, 393 U.S. 483. In some instances, such as double jeopardy, Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), insufficient evidence, cf Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978),
or lack of a speedy trial, United States v. Strunk, 412 U.S. 434 (1923), post conviction review
may result in dismissal and freedom for the petitioner.
137. Avery, 393 U.S at 486.
138. Id; Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358. Douglas addresses only the right to counsel on first
appeal but its logic can be extended to discretionary appeals.
139. Ross, 417 U.S. at 612.
140. YACKLE, supra note 7, at § 137.
141. Gagnon, 411 U.S at 787.
142. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
143. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
144. Gagnon, 411 U.S at 790-91.
145. Powell 287 U.S. at 68-69.
146. Ross, 417 U.S. at 611.
147. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393-94 (1985); Finley, 481 U.S. at 551.
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The United States Congress codified the Supreme Court's recognition
of the need for counsel for fair and proper legal proceedings in the Criminal Justice Act.'18 The Act provides a national plan for representing indigents at government expense. Although controlling only in federal courts,
the Act suggests the appropriate standards for appointing counsel for
indigents'4 9 and mandates appointment of counsel when "the interests of
justice so require. '
Opponents to appointing counsel to prepare the initial petition argue
that it will encourage post conviction review and burden the courts with
frivolous petitions."' However, "frivolity is not solely within the domain
of the impoverished. The rich as well as the poor can also be afflicted with
frivolity."' 52 The solution to frivolous petitions is dismissal.'53 Realistically, using an attorney may actually reduce the number of frivolous claims
filed by indigents.' 5 ' Instead of a shotgun approach by an unskilled petitioner, trained counsel can select the issues with potential for success and
provide the proper procedure, thus reducing the court's workload.1 5
Other opponents insist that public policy "militates" against appointing counsel for every indigent prisoner who wants legal advice."16 Arguing against appointing attorneys in post conviction proceedings, Justice
Cardine stated, "[tihe cost and delay now built into the justice system
[are] apparent. At a time when the state is struggling to balance its budget,
157
...[the Long] decision will add large sums to the cost of government."
However, the potential increase in workload for the courts should not
detract from fundamental fairness nor should judicial economy outweigh
fair consideration of constitutional claims. As aptly stated by Justice
Urbigkit, the court should not "short-circuit constitutional rights in the
search for simplicity, expediency, and maybe just less work." '
The Alberts position of providing legal counsel at the beginning of
the post conviction process is correct and complies with United States
Supreme Court's guidelines for providing indigents with counsel and
meaningful appellate procedures. The Alberts approach is not unusual;
159
courts and legislatures of other states impose similar requirements.
Illinois, the source of the Wyoming post conviction statute, and at least
148. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970).
149. Note, DiscretionaryAppointment of Counsel at Post-ConvictionProceedings:An
UnconstitutionalBarrierto Effective Post-ConvictionRelief 8 GA.L. REV. 434, 453 (1974)

(authored by Edmund M. Kneisel).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982 & Supp. IV 1987).
151. Honore v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Parole, 77 Wash. 2d 660,
466 P.2d 485, 492 (1970); see also Long, 745 P.2d at 554 (Cardine, J., dissenting).
152. Honore, 466 P.2d at 492.
153. Id.
154. YACKLE, supra note 7, at § 137.
155. Id.
156. Duncan v. Robbins, 159 Me. 337, 193 A.2d 362, 365 (1963).
157. Long, 745 P.2d at 554 (Cardine, J., dissenting).
158. Cutbirth, 751 P.2d at 1269 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
159. In 1974, eighteen states required provision of counsel for post conviction proceedings. Note, supra note 149, at 454.
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three other western states, Alaska, Colorado and Oregon, take the same
approach. The Alaska reasoning is typical:
Jails and penitentiaries include among their inmates a high percentage of persons who are totally or functionally illiterate, whose
educational attainments are slight, and whose intelligence is
limited.... In the case of all except those who are able to help
themselves - usually a few old hands or exceptionally gifted
denied access to the courts
prisoners - the prisoner is, in 6effect,
0
unless such help is available.

Thus, the Alaska court concluded that an applicant must be represented
by counsel to assure that meritorious claims will be adequately
presented.' 6' Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court reasoned that
assistance of counsel assures a "full review" of all possible constitutional
violations in one proceeding and reduces successive petitions.'62
Res Judicata
Application of res judicata is an important factor in the equation of
when to appoint counsel for post conviction relief. Where res judicata is
not applied to subsequent petitions, the timing of appointment of counsel is not a particularly important concern; a later counsel-assisted petition could remedy errors. However, where res judicata is applied, errors
due to lack of counsel are irremediable. Thus, appointing counsel before
a decision on the petition's merits becomes crucial.
The Wyoming rule is that post conviction relief does not allow relitigation of an issue already considered and decided because that issue is
res judicata.1"3 Thus, if a first post conviction petition is rejected, the statute precludes a second petition even if a different claim is presented or
the first petition was not considered on its merits.' ' Also, if a claim could
have been raised in an earlier proceeding, and should have been, the petitioner is foreclosed from relief.'"' Under Wyoming law, although no counsel assisted with the initial petition, res judicata precludes a later
application for relief.'6 6 This result is patently unfair and denies the petitioner an opportunity to effectively present his case to the court.
160. Donnelly, 516 P.2d at 399 n.6, (quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487-88
(1969)).
161. Id at 399.
162. Hubbard, 519 P.2d. at 948.
163. Bibbins, 741 P.2d at 116. This comment does not address the possibility of post
conviction review upon discovery of new evidence.
164. WYo. STAT. § 7-14-103 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
165. Cutbirth, 751 P.2d at 1262. Wyoming employs claim preclusion in post conviction
appeals unless the petitioner can show cause for failure to raise the claim and actual prejudice.
Despite its recitation of the res judicata rule, the Wyoming court has been willing to discuss
precluded issues. For example, in Whitney, 745 P.2d at 904, the Wyoming Supreme Court
stated that sentencing could not be reached under the post conviction statutes but proceeded
to address the merits of the case. So, while the Wyoming rule is one of "procedural waiver
or default," Cutbirth, 751 P.2d at 1261, the court's present application of the rule is inconsistent. Perhaps the Supreme Court is sending a signal that res judicata will soon be applied
firmly and that post conviction attorneys should review their cases for possible statutory bars.
166. WYo. STAT. § 7-14-103 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
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Proponents of res judicata argue that it is the only way to prevent
a flood of repetitive petitions. However, the burden of successive applications must be weighed against the need to prevent potentially unconstitutional imprisonment. While multiple requests are not desirable, equity and
fairness require either provision of counsel for the initial request or allowing a second request with aid of counsel.
Wyoming is not the only state to limit the number of post conviction
petitions. In fact, limitations on the number of post conviction petitions
may be more the norm than the exception.167 Generally, successive post
conviction applications on the same grounds are barred and applications
on new grounds are barred if the petitioner deliberately withheld those
issues from earlier petitions.1 68 Illinois, Alaska, Colorado and Oregon apply
res judicata to post conviction appeals but provide an exception to allow
review of successive post conviction petitions when the petitioner lacked
assistance of counsel for his first petition. 16 9 For example, the Illinois
Supreme Court stated that dismissing a pro se petition without appointing counsel, when requested, was contrary to the legislature's purpose
and applying res judicata would create due process problems.1Y0 The Alaska
Supreme Court reasoned that mandatory appointment of counsel advances
the policy of limiting post conviction relief to a single application, thereby
precluding successive applications over a period of time. 7'
The principal arguments for limiting the number of post conviction
appeals are numerous - cost, delay, reduction of workload and abuse of
the justice system. 72 The costs involved in multiple appeals and delay
in finalizing an action are readily apparent. Abuse of post conviction relief
occurs when a petitioner deliberately withholds an issue in hopes of bringing a later claim. 7 3 This should constitute waiver of the claim.' 4 There
is, however, no abuse when a claim is not presented because the petitioner
is ignorant of the facts or their legal significance. 75 Practically speaking,
it may be impossible to determine whether a petitioner was ignorant of
facts or chose to withhold them for a later appeal. 76 This practical
difficulty suggests that appointing counsel at the outset of a post conviction relief petition is a prudent approach.
Although the Wyoming Supreme Court has ample reason to try to
limit post conviction appeals to one,'77 it must recognize, as have Illinois,
167. Polansky, 233 NE.2d at 376.
168. YACKLE, supra note 7, at § 150.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 122-28.

170. Polansky, 233 N.E.2d at 376.
171. Hampton, 653 P.2d at 1060. Alaska also requires that the court provide the parties with advance notice of the reasons for summary dismissal and that the applicant be
allowed to respond before the dismissal becomes final. Id
172. Long, 745 P.2d at 554 (Cardine, J., dissenting).
173. YACKLE, supra note 7, at § 153.
174. Id.
175. Williamson, FederalHabeas Corpus:Limitations on Successive Applications from
the Same Prisoner, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 265, 280 (1973).

176. Id.
177. The Wyoming Supreme Court has heard two post conviction appeals each from Cutbirth, Boyd and Bibbins, three from Reynoldson and four from Hopkinson - perhaps five
by the time this is published.
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Alaska, Colorado and Oregon, that if res judicata is to be applied, it is
essential to appoint counsel for the first post conviction claim. Without
counsel it may be impossible for the defendant to obtain full review of
all possible constitutional issues, thereby encouraging successive petitions.
If counsel is not appointed at the beginning of the post conviction process
and the court applies res judicata to subsequent petitions, the petitioner
loses the opportunity to appeal the constitutionality of his conviction
proceedings.
The United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that a
prisoner is constitutionally entitled to successive applications for post conviction relief but has acknowledged that conventional ideas of finality have
no place where infringement of constitutional rights is alleged."'7 The Court
has also stated that our justice system should focus on allowing the fullest
179
opportunity for judicial review before denying a constitutional right.
This reluctance of the Court to permanently close the door to relief for
constitutional violations, coupled with its recognition of the general necessity of counsel for fair and meaningful proceedings, suggests that res
judicata should only be applied where widely accepted requirements for
accurate, fair legal proceedings, specifically representation by counsel,
have been met.
Extending the right to counsel at the outset of all post conviction
proceedings assures that an indigent does not unknowingly waive constitutional claims by failing to raise them in the first petition.' 0 It assures
thorough review of potential claims and eliminates deliberate withholding of claims. It eliminates the need for successive, often repetitive,
motions.' 8' The court can then apply res judicata with confidence that the
petitioner's claims had been reviewed by counsel and his rights had been
protected. The cost of appointing counsel would seem a small burden for
society to bear to protect the constitutional rights of the individual.
CONCLUSION

Denial of counsel and the consequent review of poorly drafted petitions on their merits followed by refusal to consider subsequent petitions
is antithetical to both the purpose of post conviction relief and fundamental constitutional rights. As suggested in Alberts, logic dictates that the
most prudent and efficient method to address post conviction motions
is to appoint counsel to assist with the initial petition. Appointing counsel at the beginning of the post conviction process is the simplest and
easiest way to eliminate concerns about whether a petitioner truly had
a fair opportunity to present his case. It would provide a uniform post
conviction process unhampered by discretionary appointment of counsel
178. Sanders, 373 U.S. at 15. Some authors believe that principles of res judicata are
inapplicable to federal habeas corpus proceedings. Williamson, supra note 175, at 265.
179. Noia, 372 U.S. at 424.
180. Comment, Right to Counsel in Criminal Post Conviction Review Proceedings, 51
CALIF. L. REV. 970 (1963) (authored by Gordon H. Van Kessel.
181. YACKLE, supra note 7 at § 137.
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and would avoid disputes over whether a petitioner had "meaningful
access" to the court. Res judicata could then be firmly applied, eliminating successive petitions.
The Wyoming legislature should amend the post conviction statute
to require appointment of counsel upon receipt of a post conviction petition and proof of indigency and should limit petitions to one per prisoner.
A policy of "do it once, do it right and be done with it" should please the
taxpayer and delight the courts.
Jo MESSEX CASEY
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